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Abstract. We specify an information ow analysis for a simple impera-
tive language, using a Hoare-like logic. The logic facilitates static check-
ing of a larger class of programs than can be checked by extant type-based
approaches in which a program is deemed insecure when it contains an
insecure subprogram. The logic is based on an abstract interpretation
of program traces that makes independence between program variables
explicit. Unlike other, more precise, approaches based on a Hoare-like
logic, our approach does not require a theorem prover to generate invari-
ants. We demonstrate the modularity of our approach by showing that
a frame rule holds in our logic. Moreover, given an insecure but termi-
nating program, we show how strongest postconditions can be employed
to statically generate failure explanations.
1 Introduction
This paper species an information ow analysis using a Hoare-like logic and
considers an application of the logic to explaining insecure ow of information
in simple imperative programs.
Given a system with high, or secret (H), and low, or public (L) inputs and
outputs, where L  H is a security lattice, a classic security problem is how to
enforce the following end-to-end condentiality policy: protect secret data, i.e.,
prevent leaks of secrets at public output channels. An information ow analysis
checks if a program satises the policy. Denning and Denning were the rst to
formulate an information ow analysis for condentiality[13]. Subsequent ad-
vances have been comprehensively summarized in the recent survey by Sabelfeld
and Myers [29]. An oft-used approach for specifying static analyses for infor-
mation ow is security type systems [25,31]. Security types are ordinary types
of program variables and expressions annotated with security levels. Security
typing rules prevent leaks of secret information to public channels. For example,
the security typing rule for assignment prevents H data from being assigned to
a L variable. A well-typed program \protects secrets", i.e., no information ows
from H to L during program execution.
In the security literature, \protects secrets" is formalized as noninterfer-
ence [15] and is described in terms of an \indistinguishability" relation on states.
? Supported by NSF grants CCR-0296182 and CCR-0209205Two program states are indistinguishable for L if they agree on values of L vari-
ables. The noninterference property says that any two runs of a program starting
from two initial states indistinguishable for L, yield two nal states that are in-
distinguishable for L. The two initial states may dier on values of H variables
but not on values of L variables; the two nal states must agree on the current
values of L variables. One reading of the noninterference property is as a form
of (in)dependence [9]: L output is independent of H inputs. It is this notion of
independence that is made explicit in the information ow analysis specied in
this paper.
A shortcoming of usual type-based approaches for information ow [5,16,31,
26] is that a type system can be too imprecise. Consider the sequential program
l := h;l := 0, where l has type L and h has type H. This program is rejected
by a security type system on account of the rst assignment. But the program
obviously satises noninterference { nal states of any two runs of the program
will always have the same value, 0, for l and are thus indistinguishable for L.
How can we admit such programs? Our inspiration comes from abstract
interpretation [10], which can be viewed as a method for statically computing
approximations of program invariants [11]. A benet of this view is that the static
abstraction of a program invariant can be used to annotate a program with pre-
and postconditions and the annotated program can be checked against a Hoare-
like logic. In information ow analysis, the invariant of interest is independence of
variables, for which we use the notation [x#w] to denote that x is independent
of w. The idea is that this holds provided any two runs (hereafter called traces
and formalized in Section 2) which have the same initial1 value for all variables
except for w will at least agree on the current value of x. This is just a convenient
restatement of noninterference but we tie it to the static notion of variable
independence.
The set of program traces is potentially innite, but our approach statically
computes a nite abstraction, namely a set of independences, T #, that describes
a set of traces, T. This is formalized in Section 3. We formulate (in Section 4) a
Hoare-like logic for checking independences and show (Section 5) that a checked
program satises noninterference. The assertion language of the logic is decidable
since it is just the language of nite sets of independences with subset inclusion.
Specications in the logic have the form, fT #g C fT
#
0 g. Given precondition T #,
we show in Section 6 how to compute strongest postconditions; for programs with
loops, this necessitates a xpoint computation2. We show that the logic deems
the program l := h;l := 0 secure: the strongest postcondition of the program
contains the independence [l#h].
Our approach falls in between type-based analysis and full verication where
verication conditions for loops depend on loop invariants generated by a the-
orem prover. Instead, we approximate invariants using a xpoint computation.
Our approach is modular and we show that our logic satises a frame rule (Sec-
1 The initial value of a variable is its value before execution of the whole program.
2 The set of independences is a nite lattice, hence the xpoint computation will
terminate.
2tion 7). The frame rule permits local reasoning about a program: the relevant
independences for a program are only those [x#w] where x occurs in the pro-
gram. Moreover, in a larger context, the frame rule allows the following inference
(in analogy with [23]): start with a specication fT #g C fT
#
0 g describing inde-
pendences before and after store modications; then, fT # [ T
#
1 g C fT
#
0 [ T
#
1 g
holds provided C does not modify any variable y, where [y#w] appears in T
#
1 .
The initial specication, fT #g C fT
#
0 g can reason with only the slice of store
that C touches.
We also show (Section 9) that strongest postconditions can be used to stat-
ically generate failure explanations for an insecure but terminating program. If
there is a program fragment C whose precondition contains [l#h], but whose
strongest postcondition does not contain [l#h], we know statically that C is an
oending fragment. Thus we may expect to nd two initial values of h which
produce two dierent values of l. We consider two ways this may happen [13]; we
do not consider termination, timing leaks and other covert channels. One reason
for failure of [l#h] to be in the strongest postcondition, is that C assigns H data
to a L variable. The other reason is that C is a conditional or a while loop whose
guard depends on a high variable and which updates a low variable in its body.
Consider, for example, if h then l := 1 else l := 0. Our failure explanation for
the conditional will be modulo an interpretation function, that, for distinct vari-
ables h1 and h2 map h1 to true and h2 to false. Under this interpretation, the
execution of the program produces two dierent values of l. This explains why
l is not independent of h. Because we use a static analysis, false positives may
be generated: consider if h then l := 7 else l := 7, a program that is deemed
insecure when it is clearly not. However, such false positives can be ruled out by
an instrumented semantics that tracks constant values more precisely.
Contributions. To summarize, this paper makes three contributions. First and
foremost, we formulate information ow analysis in a logical form via a Hoare-
like logic. The approach deems more programs secure than extant type-based
approaches. Secondly, we describe the relationship between information ow and
program dependence, explored in [1,18], in a more direct manner by comput-
ing independences between program variables. The independences themselves
are static descriptions of the noninterference property. In Section 8, we show
how our logic conservatively extends the security type system of Smith and
Volpano [31], by showing that any well-typed program in their system satis-
es the invariant [l#h]. Thirdly, when a program is deemed insecure, the an-
notated derivation facilitates explanations on why the program is insecure by
statically generating counterexamples. The development in this paper considers
termination-insensitive noninterference only: we assume that an attacker cannot
observe nontermination. Complete proofs of all theorems appear in the compan-
ion technical report [3]; selected proof subcases appear in the Appendix.
32 Language: syntax, traces, semantics
This section gives the syntax of a simple imperative language, formalizes the
notion of traces and gives the semantics of the language in terms of sets of
traces.
Syntax. We consider a simple imperative language with assignment, sequencing,
conditionals and loops as formalized by the following BNF. Commands C 2
Cmd are given by the syntax
C ::= x := E j C1 ;C2 j if E then C1 else C2 j while E do C
where Var is an innite set of variables, x;y;z;w 2 Var range over variables
and where E 2 Exp ranges over expressions. Expressions are left unspecied
but we shall assume the existence of a function fv(E) that computes the free
variables of expression E. For commands, fv(C) is dened in the obvious way.
We also dene a function modied : Cmd ! P(Var) that given a command,
returns the set of variables potentially assigned to by the command.
Traces. A trace t 2 Trc associates each variable with its initial value and its
current value; here values v 2 Val are yet unspecied but we assume that there
exists a predicate true? on Val. (For instance, we could have Val as the set of
integers and let true?(v) be dened as v 6= 0). We shall use T 2 P(Trc) to range
over sets of traces. Basic operations on traces include:
{ ini-t(x) which returns the initial value of x as recorded by t;
{ cur-t(x) which returns the current value of x as recorded by t;
{ t[y 7! v] which returns a trace t0 with the property: for all x 2 Var,
ini-t0(x) = ini-t(x) and if x 6= y then cur-t0(x) = cur-t(x); but cur-t0(y) = v.
{ The predicate initial T on sets of traces T holds i for all traces t 2 T, and
for all variables x, we have ini-t(x) = cur-t(x).
For instance, we could represent a trace t as a mapping Var ! Val  Val;
with t(x) = (vi;vc) we would then have ini-t(x) = vi and cur-t(x) = vc.
We shall write t1
x = t2 to denote that cur-t1(x) = cur-t2(x), and we shall
write :(t1
x = t2) to denote that t1
x = t2 does not hold. Also, with X a set of
variables we shall write t1 =
X t2 to denote that for y = 2 X, ini-t1(y) = ini-t2(y)
holds. That is, the initial values of all variables, except for those in X, are equal
in t1 and t2. We shall write t1 =
x t2 for t1 =
fxg t2.
Semantics. We assume that there exists a semantic function [[E]] : Trc ! Val
which satises the following property:
Property 1. If for all x 2 fv(E) we have t1
x = t2, then [[E]](t1) = [[E]](t2).
The denition of [[E]] would contain the clause [[x]](t) = cur-t(x). For each T and
E we dene
4[[x := E]] = T:ft
0 j 9t 2 T : t
0 = t[x 7! [[E]](t)]g
[[C1 ;C2]] = T:[[C2]]([[C1]](T))
[[if E then C1 else C2]] = T:[[C1]](E-true(T)) [ [[C2]](E-false(T))
[[while E do C0]] = lfp(F
C) where C = while E do C0 and
F
C : (P(Trc) ! P(Trc)) ! (P(Trc) ! P(Trc))
F
C(f) = T:f([[C0]](E-true(T))) [ E-false(T)
Fig.1. The Trace Semantics.
E-true(T) = ft 2 T j true?([[E]](t))g
E-false(T) = T n E-true(T):
The semantics of a command has functionality [[C]] : P(Trc) ! P(Trc), and is
dened in Fig. 1. To see that the last clause in Fig. 1 is well-dened, notice that
FC is a monotone function on the complete lattice P(Trc) ! P(Trc).
3 Independences
We are interested in a nite abstraction of a (possibly innite) set of concrete
traces. The abstract values are termed independences: an independence T # 2
Independ = P(Var  Var) is a set of pairs of the form [x#w], denoting that
the current value of x is independent of the initial value of w. This is formalized
by the following denition of when an independence correctly describes a set of
traces. The intuition is that x is independent of w i any two traces which have
the same initial values except on w must agree on the current value of x; in other
words, the initial value of w does not inuence the current value of x at all.
Denition 1. [x#w] j= T holds i for all t1;t2 2 T: t1 =
w t2 implies t1
x = t2.
T # j= T holds i for all [x#w] 2 T # it holds that [x#w] j= T.
Denition 2. The ordering T
#
1  T
#
2 holds i T
#
2  T
#
1 .
This is motivated by the desire for a subtyping rule, stating that if T
#
1  T
#
2
then T
#
1 can be replaced by T
#
2 (cf. Fact 2). Such a rule is sound provided T
#
2
is a subset of T
#
1 and therefore obtainable from T
#
1 by removing information.
Clearly, Independ forms a complete lattice wrt. the ordering; let uiT #
i de-
note the greatest lower bound (which is the set union). We have some expected
properties:3
Fact 1 If T # j= T and T1  T then T # j= T1.
3 Facts 1 and 2 are used in the proof of the correctness theorem (Theorem 5, Section 5).
5Fact 2 If T
#
1 j= T and T
#
1  T
#
2 then T
#
2 j= T.
Fact 3 If for all i 2 I it holds that T
#
i j= T, then ui2IT
#
i j= T.
Moreover, we can write a concretization function  : Independ ! P(P(Trc)):
(T #) = fT j T # j= Tg
It is easy to verify that  is completely multiplicative.Therefore [22] there exists a
Galois connection between P(P(Trc)) and Independ, with  the concretization
function. Finally, we have the following fact about initial sets of traces.
Fact 4 For all T, if initial T then [x#y] j= T for all x 6= y.
4 Static Checking of Independences
To statically check independences we dene, in Fig. 2, a Hoare-like Logic where
judgements are of the form G ` fT
#
1 g C fT
#
2 g. The judgement is interpreted
as saying that if the independences in T
#
1 hold before execution of C then,
provided C terminates, the independences in T
#
2 will hold after execution of
C. The context G 2 Context = P(Var) is a control dependence, denoting (a
superset of) the variables that at least one test surrounding C depends on. For
example, in if x then y := 0 else z := 1, the static checking of y := 0 takes
place in the context that contains all variables that x is dependent on. This is
crucial, especially since x may depend on a high variable.
We now explain a few of the rules in Fig. 2. Checking an assignment, x := E,
in context G, involves checking any [y#w] in the postcondition T #. There are
two cases. If x 6= y, then [y#w] must also appear in the precondition T
#
0 . Oth-
erwise, if x = y then [x#w] appears in the postcondition provided all variables
referenced in E are independent of w; moreover, w must not appear in G, as
otherwise, x would be (control) dependent on w.
Checking a conditional, if E then C1 else C2, involves checking C1 and C2
in a context G0 that includes not only the \old" context G but also the variables
that E depends on (as variables modied in C1 or C2 will be control dependent
on such). Equivalently, if w is not in G0, then all free variables x in E must be
independent of w, that is, [x#w] must appear in the precondition T
#
0 .
Checking a while loop is similar to checking a conditional. The only dierence
is that it requires guessing an \invariant" T # that is both the precondition and
the postcondition of the loop and its body.
In Section 6, when we dene strongest postcondition, we will select G0 = G[
fw j 9x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] = 2 T
#
0 g for the conditional and the while loop. Instead
of guessing the invariant, we will show how to compute it using xpoints.
Example 1. We have the derivations
; ` ff[l#h];[h#l]gg l := h ff[h#l];[l#l]gg and
; ` ff[h#l];[l#l]gg l := 0 ff[h#l];[l#l];[l#h]gg
6[Assign] G ` fT
#
0 g x := E fT
#g
if 8[y #w] 2 T
#
x 6= y ) [y #w] 2 T
#
0
x = y ) w = 2 G ^ 8z 2 fv(E)  [z #w] 2 T
#
0
[Seq]
G ` fT
#
0 g C1 fT
#
1 g G ` fT
#
1 g C2 fT
#
2 g
G ` fT
#
0 g C1 ;C2 fT
#
2 g
[If]
G0 ` fT
#
0 g C1 fT
#g G0 ` fT
#
0 g C2 fT
#g
G ` fT
#
0 g if E then C1 else C2 fT #g
if G  G0
and w = 2 G0 ) 8x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] 2 T
#
0
[While]
G0 ` fT
#g C fT
#g
G ` fT #g while E do C fT #g
if G  G0
and w = 2 G0 ) 8x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] 2 T
#
[Sub]
G1 ` fT
#
1 g C fT
#
2 g
G0 ` fT
#
0 g C fT
#
3 g
if T
#
0  T
#
1 and T
#
2  T
#
3 and G0  G1
Fig.2. The Hoare Logic.
and therefore also
; ` ff[l#h];[h#l]gg l := h ;l := 0 ff[h#l];[l#l];[l#h]gg
With the intuition that l stands for \low" or \public" and h stands for
\high" or \sensitive", the derivation asserts that if l is independent of h before
execution, then provided the program halts, l is independent of h after execution.
By Denition 1, any two traces of the program with dierent initial values for h,
agree on the current value for l. Thus the program is secure, although it contains
an insecure sub-program.
Example 2. The reader may check that the following informally annotated pro-
gram gives rise to a derivation in our logic. Initially, G is empty, and all variables
are pairwise independent; we write [x#y;z] to abbreviate [x#y];[x#z].
f[l#h;x];[h#l;x];[x#l;h]g
x := h f[l#h;x];[h#l;x];[x#l;x]g
if x > 0 (G is now fhg)
then l := 7 f[l#x;l];[h#l;x];[x#l;x]g
else x := 0 f[l#h;x];[h#l;x];[x#l;x]g
end of if f[l#x];[h#l;x];[x#l;x]g
A few remarks:
{ in the preamble, only x is assigned, so the independences for l and h are
carried through, but [x#l;x] holds afterwards, as [h#l;x] holds beforehand;
7{ the free variable in the guard is independent of l and x but not of h, implying
that h has to be in G.
In a judgement G ` fT
#
0 g C fT #g, suppose w 2 G. This means that any
assignment in C is control dependent on w. Suppose now that y is independent
of w in the postcondition T #. This implies that y cannot be assigned to in C
| otherwise, it would be dependent on w. If y is not assigned to in C, then y
must be independent of w in the precondition too. These intuitions are collected
together in Lemma 1 below. Note that with y interpreted as \low" and w as
\high", the lemma essentially says that low variables may not be written to
under a high guard. Thus the lemma is the counterpart of the \no write down"
rule that underlies information ow control; the term \*-property" [7] is also
used. The value of low variables remains the same after execution of C.
Lemma 1 (Write Connement).
Assume that G ` fT
#
0 g C fT #g and [y#w] 2 T # and w 2 G.
Then y = 2 modied(C) and [y#w] 2 T
#
0 .
5 Correctness
We are now in a position to prove the correctness of the Hoare logic with respect
to the trace semantics.
Theorem 5. Assume that
G ` fT
#
0 g C fT #g where for all [x#y] 2 T
#
0 , it is the case that x 6= y.
Then, initial T implies T # j= [[C]](T).
That is, if T is an initial set, then T # correctly describes the set of concrete
traces obtained by executing command C on T.
The correctness theorem can be seen as the noninterference theorem for infor-
mation ow. Indeed, with l and h interpreted as \low" and \high" respectively,
suppose [l#h] appears in T #. Then any two traces in [[C]](T) (the set of traces
resulting from the execution of command C from initial set T) that have initial
values that dier only on h, must agree on the current value of l.
Note that the correctness result deals with \terminating" traces only. For
example, with P = while h 6= 0 do h := 7 and T # = f[l#h];[h#l]g we have
the judgement ; ` fT #g P fT #g (since fhg ` fT #g h := 7 fT #g) showing that
P is deemed secure by our logic, yet an observer able to observe non-termination
can detect whether h was initially 0 or not.
To prove Theorem 5, we claim the following, more general, lemma. Then the
theorem follows by the lemma using Fact 4. Appendix A gives the proofs of cases
[Assign] and [If] of the lemma. For the latter, we use Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. If G ` fT
#
0 g C fT #g and T
#
0 j= T then also T # j= [[C]](T).
86 Computing Independences
In Fig. 3 we dene a function
sp : Context  Cmd  Independ ! Independ
with the intuition (formalized below) that given a control dependence G, a com-
mand C and a precondition T #, sp(G;C;T #) computes a postcondition T
#
1 such
that G ` fT #g C fT
#
1 g holds, and T
#
1 is the \largest" set (wrt. the subset order-
ing) that makes the judgement hold. Thus we compute the \strongest provable
postcondition", which might dier4 from the strongest semantic postcondition,
that is, the largest set T
#
1 such that for all T, if T # j= T then T
#
1 j= [[C]](T).
In the companion technical report [3], we show how to also compute \weakest
precondition"; we conjecture that the development in Sects. 7 and 9 could also
be carried out using weakest precondition instead of strongest postcondition.
We now explain two of the cases in Fig. 3. In an assignment, x := E, the
postcondition carries over all independences [y #w] in the precondition if y 6= x;
these independences are unaected by the assignment to x. Suppose that w does
not occur in context G. Then x is not control dependent on w. Moreover, if
all variables referenced in E are independent of w, then [x#w] will be in the
postcondition of the assignment.
The case for while is best explained by means of an example.
Example 3. Consider the program
C = while y do l := x ;x := y ;y := h.
Let T
#
0 :::T
#
8 be given by the following table. For example, the entry in the
column for T
#
4 and in the row for x shows that [x#h] 2 T
#
4 and [x#l] 2 T
#
4 .
T
#
0 T
#
1 T
#
2 T
#
3 T
#
4 T
#
5 T
#
6 T
#
7 T
#
8
h # fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg fl;x;yg
l # fh;x;yg fh;lg fh;lg fh;lg fhg flg flg ; flg
x # fh;l;yg fh;l;yg fh;l;xg fh;l;xg fh;lg fh;lg fl;xg flg flg
y # fh;l;xg fh;l;xg fh;l;xg fl;xg fl;xg fl;xg fl;xg fl;xg fl;xg
Our goal is to compute sp(;;C;T
#
0 ) and doing so involves the xed point com-
putation sketched below.
Iteration
rst second third
while y do T
#
0 T
#
4 = T
#
3 \ T
#
0 T
#
7 = T
#
6 \ T
#
0
G0 : fyg fh;yg fh;yg
l := x T
#
1 T
#
5 T
#
8
x := y T
#
2 T
#
6 T
#
6
y := h T
#
3 T
#
6 T
#
6
4 For example, let C = l := h   h and T
# = f[l #h]g. Then [l#h] is in the strongest
semantic postcondition, since for all T and all t 2 [[C]](T) we have cur-t(l) = 0 and
therefore [l#h] j= [[C]]T, but not in the strongest provable postcondition.
9sp(G;x := E;T
#) =
f[y #w] j y 6= x ^ [y #w] 2 T
#g [ f[x#w] j w = 2 G ^ 8y 2 fv(E)  [y #w] 2 T
#g
sp(G;C1 ;C2;T
#) = sp(G;C2;sp(G;C1;T
#))
sp(G;if E then C1 else C2;T
#) =
let G0 = G [ fw j 9x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] = 2 T
#g
T
#
1 = sp(G0;C1;T
#)
T
#
2 = sp(G0;C2;T
#)
in T
#
1 \ T
#
2
sp(G;while E do C0;T
#) =
let H
T#;G
C : Independ ! Independ be given by (C = while E do C0)
H
T#;G
C (T
#
0 ) =
let G0 = G [ fw j 9x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] = 2 T
#
0 g
in sp(G0;C0;T
#
0 ) \ T
#
in lfp(H
T#;G
C )
Fig.3. Strongest Postcondition.
For example, the entry T
#
6 in the column marked \second" and in the second
row from the bottom, denotes that sp(fh;yg;x := y;T
#
5 ) = T
#
6 .
Note that after the rst iteration, [l#h] is still present; it takes a second
iteration to lter it out and thus detect insecurity. The third iteration arms
that T
#
7 is indeed a xed point (of the functional H
T
#
0 ;;
C dened in Fig. 3).
Theorem 6 states the correctness of the function sp, that it indeed computes
a postcondition. Then, Theorem 7 states that the postcondition computed by sp
is the strongest postcondition. We shall rely on the following property:
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity). For all C, the following holds (for all G,G1,T #,T
#
1 ):
1. if G  G1 then sp(G;C;T #)  sp(G1;C;T #);
2. if T #  T
#
1 then sp(G;C;T #)  sp(G;C;T
#
1 ).
Theorem 6. For all C, G, T #, it holds that G ` fT #g C fsp(G;C;T #)g.
Theorem 7. For all judgements G ` fT
#
1 g C fT #g, sp(G;C;T
#
1 )  T #.
One case of the proof, dealing with while, is given in Appendix B.
The following result is useful for the developments in Sections 7 and 9:
Lemma 4. Given y, C with y = 2 modied(C). Then for all T #, G, w:
[y #w] 2 T # implies [y#w] 2 sp(G;C;T #)
107 Modularity and the Frame Rule
Dene lhs(T #) = fy j [y #w] 2 T #g. Then we have
Theorem 8 (Frame rule (I)). Let T
#
0 and C be given. Then for all T #, G:
1. If lhs(T
#
0 ) \ modied(C) = ; then sp(G;C;T # [ T
#
0 )  sp(G;C;T #) [ T
#
0 .
2. If lhs(T
#
0 ) \ fv(C) = ; then sp(G;C;T # [ T
#
0 ) = sp(G;C;T #) [ T
#
0 .
Note that the weaker premise in 1 does not imply the stronger consequence in
2, since (with [z #w] playing the role of T
#
0 )
sp(;;x := y + z;f[y#w]g [ f[z#w]g) = f[y#w];[z #w];[x#w]g
sp(;;x := y + z;f[y#w]g) [ f[z #w]g = f[y#w];[z #w]g:
In separation logic [19,27], the frame rule is motivated by the desire for local
reasoning: if C1 and C2 modify disjoint regions of a heap, reasoning about C1
can be performed independently of the reasoning about C2. In our setting, a
consequence of the frame rule is that when analyzing a command C occurring in
a larger context, the relevant independences are the ones whose left hand sides
occur in C.
Theorem 8 is proved by observing that part (1) follows from Lemmas 4 and
3; then part (2) follows using the following result:
Lemma 5. Let T
#
0 and C be given, with lhs(T
#
0 ) \ fv(C) = ;. Then for all T #
and G, sp(G;C;T # [ T
#
0 )  sp(G;C;T #) [ T
#
0 .
As a consequence of Theorem 8 we get the following result:
Corollary 1 (Frame rule (II)). Assume that G ` fT
#
1 g C fT
#
2 g and that
lhs(T
#
0 ) \ modied(C) = ;. Then G ` fT
#
1 [ T
#
0 g C fT
#
2 [ T
#
0 g.
Proof. Using Theorems 8 and 7 we get sp(G;C;T
#
1 [T
#
0 )  sp(G;C;T
#
1 )[T
#
0 
T
#
2 [T
#
0 . Since by Theorem 6 we have G ` fT
#
1 [ T
#
0 g C fsp(G;C;T
#
1 [ T
#
0 )g,
the result follows by [Sub].
A traditional view of modularity in the security literature is the \hook-up prop-
erty" [21]: if two programs are secure then their composition is secure as well.
Our logic satises the hook-up property for sequential composition; in our con-
text, a secure program is one which has [l#h] as an invariant (if [l#h] is in the
precondition, it is also in the strongest postcondition). With this interpretation,
Sabelfeld and Sands's hook-up theorem holds [30, Theorem 5].
118 The Smith-Volpano Security Type System
In the Smith-Volpano type system [31], variables are labelled by security types;
for example, x : (T;) means that x has type T and security level . The security
typing rules are given in Fig. 4 in Appendix C. To handle implicit ows due to
conditionals, the technical development requires commands to be typed (com)
with the intention that all variables assigned to in such commands have level at
least . The judgement   ` C : (com ) says that in the security type context  ,
that binds free variables in C to security types, command C has type (com ).
We now show a conservative extension: if a command is well-typed in the
Smith-Volpano system, then for any two traces, the current values of low vari-
ables are independent of the initial values of high variables. For simplicity, we
consider a command with only two variables, h with level H and l with level L.
Theorem 9. Assume that C can be given a security type wrt. environment h :
( ;H);l : ( ;L). Then for all T #, if [l#h] 2 T # then [l#h] 2 sp(;;C;T #).
The upshot of the theorem is that a well-typed program has [l#h] as invari-
ant: if [l#h] appears in the precondition, then it also appears in the strongest
postcondition.
The theorem is a straightforward consequence of the following lemma which
facilitates a proof by induction. For L commands, the assumption h 62 G in the
lemma says that L commands cannot be control dependent on H guards. A
proof of part 1, the case for while, appears in Appendix C.
Lemma 6.
1. Suppose h : ( ;H);l : ( ;L) ` C : (com H). Then for all G;T #, if [l#h] 2
T # then [l#h] 2 sp(G;C;T #).
2. Suppose h : ( ;H);l : ( ;L) ` C : (com L). Then for all G;T #, if [l#h] 2
T # and h 62 G then [l#h] 2 sp(G;C;T #).
9 Counter-example Generation
Assume that a program C cannot be deemed secure by our logic, that is,
[l#h] = 2 sp(;;C;T #) (where T #  f[l#h]g). Then we might expect that we
can nd a \witness": two dierent initial values of h that produce two dierent
nal values of l. However, below we shall see three examples of false positives:
programs which, while deemed insecure by our logic, do not immediately satisfy
that property. Ideally, we would like to strengthen our analysis so as to rule
out such false positives; this does not seem immediately feasible and instead, in
order to arrive at a suitable result, we shall modify our semantics so the false
positives become genuine positives.
First, a program where writing a high expression to a low variable does not
reveal anything about the high variable:
12l := h   h. (1)
To deal with that, we assume that expressions are unevaluated (kept as symbolic
trees); the formal requirement will be expressed as Property 2.
Next, a program where writing to a low variable under high guard does not
immediately enable an observer to determine the value of the high variable.
if h then l := 7 else l := 7 (2)
To deal with that, we tag each assignment statement so that an observer can
detect which branch is taken.
Finally, a program where there cannot be two dierent nal values of l:
while h do l := 7 (3)
There seems to be no simple way to x this, except to rule out loops, thus in
eect considering only programs with a xed bound on run-time (since for such,
a loop can be unfolded repeatedly and eventually replaced by a sequence of
conditionals; this is how we handle loops with low guard). Remember (cf. the
discussion in Section 5) that a program deemed secure by our logic may not be
really secure if non-termination can be observed; similarly a program deemed
insecure may not be really insecure if non-termination cannot be observed.
Even with the above modications, the existence of a witness is not amenable
to a compositional proof. For example, consider the program
x := E1(h) ;l := E2(x) (4)
where E1 and E2 are some expressions. Inductively, on the assignment to l, we
can nd two dierent values for x, v1 and v2, such that the resulting values of
l are dierent. But we then need an extremely strong property concerning the
assignment to x: that there exists two dierent values of h such that evaluating
E1(h) wrt. these values produces v1, respectively v2.
Instead, we shall settle for a result which says that all pairs of dierent initial
values for h are witnesses, in that the resulting values of l are dierent. Of course,
we need to introduce some extra assumptions to establish this stronger property.
For example, consider the following program, where two dierent values of h,
say 3 and 4, may cause the same branch to be taken:
if h = 0 then l := 17 else l := 7 (5)
To deal with that, our result must say that for every two values of h there exists
an interpretation of true? such that wrt. that interpretation, dierent values of l
result. In the above, we might stipulate that true?(3 = 0) but not true?(4 = 0).
It turns out to be convenient to let that interpretation depend on the guard in
question; hence we shall also tag guards so as to distinguish between dierent
occurrences of the same guard.
We shall now formalize the changes suggested above. First, we assume the
existence of tags  2 Tag, and functions tg : Tag  Val ! Val, get-tg : Val !
Tag, un-tg : Val ! Val such that get-tg(tg(v)) =  and un-tg(tg(v)) = v.
13Commands C are now given by the syntax
C ::=  : x := E j C1 ;C2 j if  : E then C1 else C2
where we have introduced assignment tags and guard tags. We write tg-t(x) for
get-tg(cur-t(x)), write  2 C if  occurs syntactically in C, and write t  C if
for all x 2 Var, tg-t(x) = 2 C.
In the following, we shall assume that tags are unique, that is, no tag  occurs
twice in a program C. As mentioned above, for the purposes of this section we
shall rely on the following
Property 2. If there exists z 2 fv(E) with :(t1
z = t2), then [[E]](t1) 6= [[E]](t2).
Concerning how to modify the semantics of commands, rst observe that with
the denition in Fig. 1, it holds for programs without loops that [[C]] applied
to a singleton set ftg returns a singleton set (this follows from a simple struc-
tural induction, simultaneously proving that [[C]](;) = ;). This motivates that
we should now dene the semantics as a function from Trc to Trc (rather than
between the powersets), but as mentioned above we shall also need interpreta-
tion functions where an interpretation function I 2 Intp is a partially dened
predicate on values. We say that I covers C if I(v) is dened exactly when there
exists a guard tag  2 C such that v = tg(v0) for some v0.
The semantics of a command thus has functionality Intp ! Trc ! Trc and
is dened as follows:
[[ : x := E]]I = t:t[x 7! tg([[E]](t))]
[[C1 ;C2]]I = t:[[C2]]I([[C1]]I(t))
[[if  : E then C1 else C2]]I = t:cond(I(tg([[E]](t)));[[C1]]I(t);[[C2]]I(t)):
We can now state our result concerning counter-examples; as discussed above
it seems to be the best we can hope for.
Theorem 10. Assume that sp(;;C;T #) = T
#
1 , with [x#h] 2 T # for x 6= h
and with [l#h] = 2 T
#
1 . Further assume that :(t1
h = t2), with t1  C and t2  C.
Then there exists I covering C such that :([[C]]I(t1)
l = [[C]]I(t2)).
This theorem is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 7, stated below.
Denition 3. We say that C reveals y using z if for all t1, t2 with t1  C and
t2  C and :(t1
z = t2) there exists an interpretation function I covering C such
that :([[C]]I(t1)
y
= [[C]]I(t2)).
Lemma 7. Assume that with h = 2 G we have sp(G;C;T #) = T
#
1 , and assume
that [y #h] = 2 T
#
1 . Then there exists z such that [z #h] = 2 T #, and such that C
reveals y using z.
Example 4. We consider an adaptation of the password checking example from
[8], with the while loop unfolded twice.
14if 1 : p = g1 then 2 : f := 1
else if 3 : p = g2 then 4 : f := 1 else 5 : f := 2
By Theorem 10 there exists an interpretation function, I, such that for two
distinct values of p, namely, p1 and p2, f assumes dierent values. The I provided
by the proof of the theorem will satisfy I(tg1(p1 = g1)) = true but I(tg1(p2 =
g1)) = false. Then p1 will result in a value of f which is tagged with 2, and p2
will result in another value of f which is tagged with either 4 or 5 (depending
on the value of I(tg3(p2 = g2))). Hence the particular branch taken for the
computation is revealed.
10 Discussion
Perspective. This paper species an information ow analysis for condentiality
using a Hoare-like logic and considers an application of the logic to explaining
insecurity in simple imperative programs. Program traces, potentially innitely
many, are abstracted by nite sets of variable independences. These variable
independences can be statically computed using strongest postconditions, and
can be statically checked against the logic.
Giacobazzi and Mastroeni [14] consider attackers as abstract interpretations
and generalize the notion of noninterference by parameterizing it wrt. what an
attacker can analyze about the input/output information ow. For instance,
assume an attacker can only analyze the parity (odd/even) of values. Then
while h do l := l + 2 ;h := h   1
is secure, although it contains an update of a low variable under a high guard.
We might try to model this approach in our framework by parameterizing De-
nition 1 wrt. parity, but it is not clear how to alter the proof rules accordingly.
Instead, we envision our logic to be put on top of abstract interpretations. In
the parity example, the above program would be abstracted to
while h do h := h   1
which our logic already deems secure.
Related work. Perhaps the most closely related work is the one of Clark, Han-
kin, and Hunt [8], who consider a language similar to ours and then extend it to
Idealized Algol, requiring distinguishing between identiers and locations. The
analysis for Idealized Algol is split in two stages: the rst stage does a control-
ow analysis, specied using a ow logic [22]. The second stage species what is
an acceptable information ow analysis with respect to the control-ow analysis.
The precision of the control-ow analysis inuences the precision of the infor-
mation ow analysis. Flow logics usually do not come with a frame rule so it is
unclear what modularity properties their analysis satises. For each statement
S in the program, they compute the set of dependences introduced by S; a pair
(x;y) is in that set if dierent values for y prior to execution of S may result in
15dierent values for x after execution of S. For a complete program, they thus,
as expected, compute essentially the same information as we do, but the infor-
mation computed locally is dierent from ours: we estimate if dierent initial
values of y, i.e., values of y prior to execution of the whole program, may result
in dierent values for x after execution of S. Unlike our approach, their analysis
is termination-sensitive.
To make our logic termination-sentitive5, we could (analogous in spirit to
[8]) dene [? #w] to mean that if two tuples of initial values are equal except
for on w, then either both tuples give rise to terminating computations, or both
tuples give rise to innite computations. For instance, if
` fT
#
0 g while x > 7 do x := x + 1 fT #g
and [x#h] does not belong to T
#
0 then [? #h] should not belong to T # (neither
of any subsequent assertion), since dierent values of h may result in dierent
values of x and hence of dierent termination properties. To prove semantic
correctness for the revised logic we would need to also revise our semantics,
since currently it does not facilitate reasoning about innite computations.
Joshi and Leino [20] provide an elegant semantic characterization of non-
interference that allows handling both termination-sensitive and termination-
insensitive noninterference. Their notion of security for a command C is equa-
tionally characterized by C ;HH = HH ;C ;HH, where HH means that an
arbitrary value is assigned to a high variable. They show how to express their
notion of security in Dijkstra's weakest precondition calculus. Although they do
not consider synthesizing loop invariants, this can certainly be done via a xpoint
computation with weakest preconditions. However, their work is not concerned
with computing dependences, nor do they consider generating counterexamples.
Darvas, H ahnle and Sands [12] use dynamic logic to express secure informa-
tion ow in JavaCard. They discuss several ways that noninterference can be
expressed in a program logic, one of which is as follows: consider a program with
variables l and h. Consider another copy of the program with l, h relabeled to
fresh variables l0, h0 respectively. Then, noninterference holds in the following
situation: running the original program and the copy sequentially such that the
initial state satises l = l0 should yield a nal state satisfying l = l0. Like us,
they are interested in showing insecurity by exhibiting distinct initial values for
high variables that give distinct current values of low variables; unlike us, they
look at actual runtime values. To achieve this accuracy, they need the power of
a general purpose theorem prover, which is also helpful in that they can express
declassication, as well as treat exceptions (which most approaches based on
static analysis cannot easily be extended to deal with).
Barthe, D'Argenio and Rezk [6] use the same idea of self-composition (i.e.,
composing a program with a copy of itself) as Darvas et alii and investigate
\abstract" noninterference [14] for several languages. By parameterizing non-
interference with a property, they are able to handle more general information
5 For an analysis protecting against timing leaks and hence as a special case against
attackers observing termination behavior, see [2].
16ow policies, including a form of declassication known as delimited information
release [28]. They show how self-composition can be formulated in logics describ-
ing these languages, namely, Hoare logic, separation logic, linear temporal logic,
etc. They also discuss how to use their results for model checking programs
with nite state spaces to check satisfaction of their generalized denition of
noninterference.
The rst work that used a Hoare-style semantics to reason about information
ow was by Andrews and Reitman [4]. Their assertions keep track of the security
level of variables, and are able to deal even with parallel programs. However, no
formal correctness result is stated.
Conclusion. Beyond the work reported here, much remains to be done. This
paper was inspired in part by presentations by Roberto Giacobazzi and Reiner
H ahnle at the Dagstuhl Seminar on Language-based Security in October 2003.
The reported work is only the rst step in our goal to formulate more general
denitions of noninterference in terms of program (in)dependence, such that the
denitions support modular reasoning. One direction to consider is to repeat
the work in this paper for a richer language, with methods, pointers, objects
and dynamic memory allocation; an obvious goal here is interprocedural reason-
ing about variable independences perhaps using a higher-order version of the
frame rule [24]. H ahnle's Dagstuhl presentation inspired us to look at explain-
ing insecurity by showing counterexamples. We plan to experiment with model
checkers supporting linear arithmetic, for example BLAST [17], to (i) establish
independences that our logic cannot nd (cf. the false positives from Sect. 9); (ii)
provide \genuine" counterexamples that are counterexamples wrt. the original
semantics.
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A Correctness
Our main goal is to prove Lemma 2, but rst a bit of preparation.
Lemma 8. For all C, for all T, for all t0 2 [[C]](T) the following holds: there
exists t 2 T such that t =
; t0 and such that for all y 2 Var, t
y
= t0 or y 2
modied(C).
Lemma 2 Assume that G ` fT #g C fT
#
0 g and T # j= T.
Then also T
#
0 j= [[C]](T).
Proof. We perform induction in the derivation of G ` fT #g C fT
#
0 g, and do a
case analysis on the last rule applied. We list two cases only:
[Assign], with C = x := E. Let [z #w] 2 T
#
0 , and let t1;t2 2 [[C]](T) with t1=
w t2;
we must show that t1
z = t2. From the denition of [[C]] we know there exists
t0
1;t0
2 2 T such that for i = 1;2 we have
t0
i =
; ti, and
8y 6= x  t0
i
y
= ti, and (1)
cur-ti(x) = [[E]](t0
i). (2)
We infer that
19t0
1 =
w t0
2 (3)
and split into two cases.
{ If z 6= x, then [z #w] 2 T #, so from T # j= T and (3) we infer t0
1
z = t0
2.
Using (1) this gives us the desired t1
z = t2.
{ If z = x, then for all y 2 fv(E) we have [y #w] 2 T # which (using (3) and
T # j= T) implies t0
1
y
= t0
2; by Property 1 it therefore holds that [[E]](t0
1) =
[[E]](t0
2). From (2) we then get the desired relation cur-t1(x) = cur-t2(x).
[If], with C = if E then C1 else C2. Assume that
G0 ` fT #g C1 fT
#
0 g and G0 ` fT #g C2 fT
#
0 g (4)
where w = 2 G0 implies that 8x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] 2 T #. Let [z #w] 2 T
#
0 , and
let t1;t2 2 [[C]](T) with t1 =
w t2; we must show that t1
z = t2. There are essentially
(apart from symmetry) two cases:
t1;t2 both belong to [[C1]](E-true(T)). From T # j= T we by Fact 1 see
that also T # j= E-true(T), so the induction hypothesis tells us that T
#
0 j=
[[C1]](E-true(T)). Since [z #w] 2 T
#
0 , this implies the desired t1
z = t2.
t1 belongs to [[C1]](E-true(T)); t2 belongs to [[C2]](E-false(T)).
By Lemma 8, there exists t0
1 2 E-true(T) and t0
2 2 E-false(T) such that for
i = 1;2 we have
ti =
; t0
i and
for all y 2 Var, ti
y
= t0
i or y 2 modied(Ci). (5)
We infer that
t0
1 =
w t0
2 (6)
It holds that w 2 G0. For assume the contrary, that w = 2 G0. Then for all
x 2 fv(E) we have [x#w] 2 T # which (using (6) and T # j= T) implies t0
1
x = t0
2;
by Property 1 it therefore holds that [[E]](t0
1) = [[E]](t0
2) contradicting the fact
that t0
1 but not t0
2 belongs to E-true(T).
Having established w 2 G0, using Lemma 1 we infer from (4) that
z = 2 modied(C1) and z = 2 modied(C2) and (7)
[z #w] 2 T #. (8)
From (6) and (8) we infer (using T # j= T) that t0
1
z = t0
2. From (5) and (7) we
infer t1
z = t0
1 and t2
z = t0
2. But this implies the desired relation t1
z = t2.
20 ;x : (T;) ` E : (T;)
 ;x : (T;) ` x := E : (com )
  ` E : (int;)   ` C1 : (com )   ` C2 : (com )
  ` if E then C1 else C2 : (com )
  ` C1 : (com )   ` C2 : (com )
  ` C1 ;C2 : (com )
  ` E : (int;)   ` C : (com )
  ` while E do C : (com )
  ` C : (com 1)   1
  ` C : (com )
Fig.4. The Smith-Volpano Type System: Rules for Commands
B Strongest Postcondition
Theorem 7 For all judgements G ` fT
#
1 g C fT #g, sp(G;C;T
#
1 )  T #.
Proof. We perform induction in the derivation of G ` fT
#
1 g C fT #g, and do a
case analysis on the last rule applied. We only list the case for while.
[While], with C = while E do C0. Assume that G ` fT #g C fT #g because
G1 ` fT #g C0 fT #g where G  G1 and where
w = 2 G1 implies that 8x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] 2 T #.
Assume sp(G;C;T #) = T
#
0 to show T
#
0  T #. By the denition of sp, T
#
0 =
lfp(H
T
#;G
C ). Inductively, sp(G1;C0;T #)  T #.
Now H
T
#;G
C (T #) = sp(G0;C0;T #) \ T # where G0 = G [ fw j 9x 2 fv(E) 
[x#w] = 2 T #g. Note that G0  G1. Thus, using Lemma 3,
H
T
#;G
C (T #) = (sp(G0;C0;T #) \ T #)  (sp(G1;C0;T #) \ T #) = T #.
This shows that H
T
#;G
C is reductive at T #, so by Tarski's theorem we infer the
desired relation T
#
0 = lfp(H
T
#;G
C )  T #.
C The Smith-Volpano Type System
Lemma 6 (part 1) Suppose h : ( ;H);l : ( ;L) ` C : (com H). Then for all
G;T #, if [l#h] 2 T # then [l#h] 2 sp(G;C;T #).
21Proof. We go by induction on the derivation of C with cases on the last rule
used; we list only the case for while.
C = while E do C0. Then h : ( ;H);l : ( ;L) ` C0 : (com H). Let T
#
0 =
sp(G;C;T #). Then T
#
0 = lfp(H
T
#;G
C ). Hence T
#
0 = H
T
#;G
C (T
#
0 ).
Let T
#
1 = T
#
0 [ [l#h]. Now
H
T
#;G
C (T
#
1 ) = sp(G0;C0;T
#
1 ) \ T #; where
G0 = G [ fw j 9x 2 fv(E)  [x#w] = 2 T
#
1 g. Inductively, as [l#h] 2 T
#
1 , we get,
[l#h] 2 sp(G0;C0;T
#
1 ). Thus,
[l#h] 2 H
T
#;G
C (T
#
1 ). (1)
Because H
T
#;G
C is a monotone function, from T
#
1  T
#
0 we get H
T
#;G
C (T
#
1 ) 
H
T
#;G
C (T
#
0 ) = T
#
0 . Thus
T
#
0  H
T
#;G
C (T
#
1 ). (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we get T
#
1  H
T
#;G
C (T
#
1 ), i.e., H
T
#;G
C (T
#
1 )  T
#
1 .
This shows that H
T
#;G
C is reductive at T
#
1 , so by Tarski's theorem, T
#
0 =
lfp(H
T
#;G
C )  T
#
1 , that is, T
#
1  T
#
0 . Hence [l#h] 2 T
#
0 .
22